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This paper uses a variant of the standard search model to examine 
market equilibrium and the consequences for market equilibrium of 
an increase in the number of firms. If marginal search costs increase 
with the number of searches, then the demand curve facing any firm 
will be kinked, with the elasticity of demand with respect to price 
decreases being less than with respect to price increases; prices may 
not change in response to changes in marginal costs. As the number 
of firms increases, the maximum price that is consistent with equilib- 
rium increases, to the monopoly price, but the minimum price de- 
creases. On the other hand, if marginal search costs decrease with 
the number of searches, equilibrium, if it exists, is characterized by a 
price distribution. 
How many firms are needed to make a market function competi- 
tively? If there is perfect information, two firms that behave like Ber- 
trand competitors will drive the price to marginal cost.1 In contrast, in 
a Cournot equilibrium, as the number of firms increases, the per- 
ceived elasticity of demand increases, and price falls; the competitive 
price is attained only in the limit. 
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Though it has long been recognized that imperfect information 
would make markets act less competitively (Scitovsky 1950; Salop 
1976), modern search theory has raised serious questions concerning 
the robustness of even the qualitative result that increasing the num- 
ber of firms should lead to lower prices. Although the nature of' 
market equilibrium with a finite number of firms has not been exten- 
sively studied, the case in which there is an infinite number of firms 
has been. If individuals search sequentially and there are finite search 
costs (no matter how small), then the market equilibrium is the mo- 
nopoly price. Two other striking results have been obtained: (1) there 
cannot exist an equilibrium price distribution (see Diamond 1971); 
and (2) if there is a fixed cost associated with the first search, equilib- 
rium will not exist if (see Stiglitz 1979; Salop and Stiglitz 1982) (a) 
firms can use nonlinear price schedules or (b) individuals have a utility 
function that leads them to buy one unit if the price is below some 
reservation price level. 
Search costs, even small search costs, have an enormous effect on 
the nature of the equilibrium.2 
The objective of this paper is to consider the consequence of three 
seemingly minor modifications of the standard sequential search 
model: (1) There are some individuals with infinitesimal search costs. 
If F(s) is the distribution function of individuals by search costs, s, and 
f(s) is the density, then f(0) > 0.3 (2) There are a finite number of' 
firms rather than an infinite number of' firms. (3) The cost of sam- 
pling an additional firm may depend on the number of firms already 
sampled. 
If there are a finite number of firms, the equilibrium price is below 
the monopoly price: duopoly appears to be more competitive than 
atomistic competition. The reason for this is that, in the atomistic 
models that have been studied, if a firm lowers its price, it will not 
induce search, whereas in a duopoly, it will. Thus the perceived price 
elasticity with duopoly is greater than in atomistic competition. As the 
number of firms increases, the cost of finding a low-price store in- 
creases. Hence, the amount of induced search is reduced. Increasing 
the number of firms seems to have an anticompetitive effect. 
As the number of firms increases, however, there are two effects: if' 
a firm lowers its price, only those with relatively low search costs will 
find it worthwhile to search since it is harder to find this "bargain." 
2 For a survey of these results, see Stiglitz (1979). See also Axell (1977) and von zur 
Muehlen (1980). 
3 Braverman (1980) and Braverman and Dixit (1981) have investigated the conse- 
quences of f(0) > 0 in the slightly different context of the Salop and Stiglitz (1977) 
model of search. 
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But while a smaller percentage of individuals at any store are induced 
to search, there are more stores from which customers can be at- 
tracted. When search costs are constant and there is search with re- 
placement,4 the second effect is shown to dominate the first: The 
conventional result that increasing the number of firms increases the effec- 
tive degree of competitiveness in the market is reestablished. In the limit, as 
the number of stores increases to infinity, the price decreases mono- 
tonically from the monopoly price to a price that is lower by an 
amount that depends on f(O), provided only thatf(O) > 0.5 
Thus the standard characterization of the equilibrium with a con- 
tinuum of firms as entailing the monopoly price is not correct if f(O) 
> 0. 
Standard expositions, while focusing on the first effect, have failed 
to note the importance of the second effect. Thus, as the number of 
firms increases, the store that lowers its price recruits very few cus- 
tomers from each of a very large number of stores. It is not correct 
simply to assume that the number recruited from any one store goes 
to zero faster than the number of stores increases. 
Standard expositions have made a second, important error: they 
have failed to note the asymmetry of information that is created in 
these markets the moment an individual arrives at a store. He knows 
the price at that store; he knows only the distribution of prices at 
other stores. This asymmetry of information has an important conse- 
quence: the elasticity of demand with respect to price increases may 
differ markedly from the elasticity of demand with respect to price 
decreases. Demand curves in general will be kinked. This in turn has 
two consequences: (1) If there are a finite number of firms, marginal 
search costs are constant, and search is conducted without replace- 
ment, then the only equilibria entail price distributions; this result 
holds more generally with decreasing marginal search costs. This re- 
sult generalizes the analysis of Salop and Stiglitz (1977), who em- 
ployed the limiting case of a convex search technology in which all 
searches after the first wei-e, in effect, free. (2) If there are increasing 
marginal search costs, there may be an indeterminacy of equilibria, 
and output may not change when marginal costs change. 
There are two reasons why it is important to investigate models that 
generate price distributions. First, there is considerable evidence that 
product markets are frequently characterized by essentially identical 
commodities being sold at markedly different prices,6 and a model of 
4 Search without replacement means that if an individual samples a store and rejects 
it, he will not return to it. 
5In the limiting case in which f(O) = 0, there is a critical number of firms, N, below 
which there is no single price equilibrium (see Arrow and Rothschild 1973). 
6 Those who believe in the law of the single price may claim that the products sold at 
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the product market should at least admit this as a possible outcome.7 
Second, I noted earlier that, under plausible conditions, if the first 
search is costly, there exists no equilibrium in the market. This seem- 
ing paradox is resolved if there is at least some probability that the 
price charged is below the monopoly price. Thus the models we have 
constructed have an internal consistency that was lacking from the 
models of product markets in which all consumers have strictly posi- 
tive search costs and there is a continuum of firms.8 
This paper is divided into four sections. The model is presented in 
Section I, while Section II presents the results for a finite number of 
firms and linear search cost technology. Section III shows how the 
analysis is altered with a nonlinear search cost technology. Section IV 
considers the robustness of the results. 
I. The Model 
Let us consider a market in which, for simplicity, all individuals have 
identical demand functions for the given commodity, x = x(p), but 
they differ in their search costs. The individual's indirect utility func- 
tion can be written as 
U = v(p) + Y, (1) 
where Y is the individual's income. Thus, by Roy's formula, 
x = -V'. (2) 
Individuals have a simple search rule: purchase if, on the tth search, 
p C 1t; do not if p > 't. The term 1t is the reservation price for the tth 
search. It is the price such that the utility an individual obtains from 
purchasing at the store he is at presently is equal to the expected 
different prices differ in some important way, e.g., location, service, etc. This may be 
true in some instances, but in other instances the magnitude of the price differences is 
sufficiently large to suggest that these "quality" differences cannot fully account for the 
observed price differences. In those cases in which these quality differences are impor- 
tant, the appropriate model for analyzing the market is a differentiated commodity 
market with search costs; such markets will, in general, be characterized by price distri- 
butions in the natural sense that, even if the technologies with which the goods are 
produced are identical, they will sell for different prices. 
7 Indeed, this was one of Rothschild's (1973) most salient ci iticisms of' Stigler's (196 1) 
model: given Stigler's assumptions concerning consumer behavior, all firms would 
charge the same price. 
8 Formally, we can avoid these nonexistence difficulties in the standard way by as- 
suming that the first search is free (see Sec. I). But this is clearly an unsatisfactory 
assumption. If we assume that the first search costs the same as subsequent searches, 
our analysis will essentially be unaffected provided the average equilibrium price is low 
enough; i.e., f(O) is high enough. (Otherwise, we would again encounter problems of' 
existence.) 
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utility he obtains from continuing search. How the expected utility 
from continuing search is calculated depends on the nature of the 
search process, for example, whether search is with or without re- 
placement.) 
Assume that in this market there are L individuals and N firms.'0 
All individuals know the probability distribution of prices, but not 
which store charges which price."' Customers randomly search 
among firms. Each individual continues to search until he finds a 
store that charges a price at or below his reservation price. 
Denote by s, the cost of the tth search. The literature has focused on 
three special cases: (a) Linear search cost technologies for which s, = T, 
a constant, for t > 1. Because equilibrium may not exist if s1 > 0, I 
assume s, = 0. (b) Convex search technologies. The scarcity of time 
(and other resources) means that search costs may increase with the 
number of searches: st - st for all t. A special case of this (used, e.g., 
in Salop and Stiglitz [1982]) entails fixed search costs up to some t and 
infinite search costs beyond that. (c) Concave search technologies. If 
stores are clustered around a shopping area, then most of the costs 
associated with shopping may be the fixed costs of going to the shop- 
ping center. Similarly, if individuals obtain information by purchas- 
ing, say, a consumer report, they are likely to obtain information 
about several stores simultaneously. These are all cases in which the 
marginal cost of search is less than the average, that is, st ' st- 1 for all 
t. The limiting case of this, explored by Salop and Stiglitz (1977), is 
that in which sI > 0, st = 0 for t > 1. 
Individuals differ in their search costs. In the case of linear search 
technology, we can represent this by the distribution function F(s). 
We can represent the revenue of the firm by 
R = Mpx, (3) 
where M is the number of customers who purchase; M is a function of 
the price charged by the given firm as well as prices charged by other 
firms. 
The marginal cost of the product is c. Thus the profit-maximizing 
9 In either case, under the assumption of constant search costs, if it pays the individ- 
ual to continue searching when he samples a price p today, it pays him to continue 
searching if he subsequently samples the same price at another store. 
1() Throughout the analysis, the number of firms will be exogenously determined. 
But it is easy to allow the endogenous determination of N, as in Salop and Stiglitz 
(1977), with U-shaped average cost curves for firms. 
l This is a standard assumption in this literature. Though there are some circum- 
stances in which it may have some validity, its main justification is that it greatly 
simplifies the analysis. 
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firm sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, or 
1 -(1k)' (4) 
where E is the elasticity of the demand curve facing the firm: 
_ d InM + E (p*), (5) 
where E is the elasticity of the individual demand curves, 
E (P)- -x ' () PX (6) 
Note that, for a monopolist, d In Mld In p = 0, SO E = E(p*). We can 
denote the monopoly price by pm: 
m_ C 
- 
1 - [1!E(pm)] 
When M, the number of customers, is not a differentiable function of 
p, we denote by e+ and e- the elasticity with respect to price increases 
and decreases. 
If E+(p*) > E-(p*), as in figure 1, the demand curve has a kink at 
p = p*, and prices will not, as a result, respond to changes in marginal 




1 - [1/E+(p*)] P 1 - [llE-(p*)]( 
Much of the remainder of the paper is devoted to ascertaining how 
the number of customers changes with changes in p; that is, is M 
differentiable and what is the value of E+ and E-? 
II. Symmetric Equilibrium with a Finite Number 
of Firms,f(O) > 0, and Linear Search 
Technology 
When there are a finite number of firms, it makes a difference 
whether search is with or without replacement. 12 In the first two parts 
of this section, we will consider only the symmetric equilibrium. With 
linear search costs, the reservation price, pt, is a constant for all t and is 
denoted by p. 
12 Which is more plausible depends on the memory of searchers and on whether 
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FIG. 1.-a, Kinked demand curve. b, Equilibrium with a continuum of firms andf(O) 
> 0: the equilibrium is indeterminate; the price must be less than or equal to the 
monopoly price but greater than or equal to p. 
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A. Search without Replacement 
Consider a market with N firms, all charging a price p = p*. In 
equilibrium, each sells to LIN customers. One firm contemplates rais- 
ing its price to p > p*. Its low-search-cost customers will leave. Cus- 
tomers know for certain that on the next search they will find a low- 
price store. Hence, all those with search costs less than sg leave, where sg 
is defined by 
(p - v(p) = s(p). (8) 
Equation (8) tells us how many individuals will be searching: all those 
with s < S. The function F(s^(p)) gives the fraction of individuals who 
search at each value of p. Using equation (2), we get 
d= -v' (p) = x(p). (9) 
The store that raises its price thus finds that it sells only to 
L M = -[1 - F(s^(p))] (10) N 
customers. Differentiating (10), we see that the elasticity of demand at 
p = p* is 
E+ (p*) = E (p*) + f(O)x (p*)p*. (11) 
A firm that contemplates lowering its price below p* knows that it 
will attract the lowest-search-cost individuals from all other stores 
while retaining all the high-search-cost people who happen by chance 
to arrive at its doorstep. Its expected number of customers will be 
L[F(p(P)) + NI' (p)) (12) 
where A(p) is the critical search cost (a function of the price charged by 
the low-price store) such that all individuals with s ' s^ search until 
they find the low-price store. 
The expected number of searches to find the single low-price store 
(if an individual arrives at a high-price store) is N!2; hence s^ is given by 
v(p) - v(p*) = (p) i2 . (13) 
It immediately follows that the demand elasticity with respect to price 
decreases is 
E-(p*) = E(p*) + 2(N 1) f(O)p*x(p*) ' E+(p*), (14) N 
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FIG. 2.-With three stores and search without replacement there is a kink at p* so 
that there cannot exist a single price equilibrium. 
with equality holding only for N = 2. Thus, if there are more than 
two firms, there is a kink in the demand curve, with the elasticity of 
demand for price decreases exceeding that for price increases. This 
immediately implies that for N > 2 there cannot be a single price equilib- 
rium (see fig. 2). 
B. Search with Replacement 
The analysis is identical to that given before except now, if a single 
firm raises its price, it will take an individual who happens to arrive at 
the high-price store, on average, N/(N - 1) searches to find a low- 
price store. However, if a single firm lowers its price, it will take N 
searches, on average, for an individual who first arrives at a high- 
price store (one charging p*) to find the low-price store. Modifying 
equation (13), determining the marginal individual who searches in 
the appropriate way, we can immediately calculate the elasticity of 
demand for price increases and price decreases: 
+ - =e = E + f(O)pxN N (14') 
Now there is no kink in the demand curve; there exists a single price 
equilibrium, and the price is below the monopoly price. Moreover, as 
the number of firms increases, the market price falls monotonically.'3 
1' This result stands in marked contrast to that of Satterthwaite (1979), who argued 
that as the number of firms increases the degree of imperfection of information in- 
creases. This reduces the demand elasticity and hence increases the market equilibrium 
price (see also Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981). His model differs in two crucial ways 
from the one presented here: (a) He was concerned with heterogeneous goods, with 
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1 - [l/E(pm)] = 
where 
e = E(p) +f(O)px(/3). (15) 
C. Equilibrium Price Distributions 
When there is search without replacement, there never exists a single 
price equilibrium; the only equilibria are those in which different 
stores charge different prices. But even when there exists a single 
price equilibrium, there may exist other equilibria, with different 
stores charging different prices.'4 Since each firm will perceive an 
elasticity of demand that exceeds E (i.e., if it raises its price, it loses 
some customers; if it lowers its price, it gains some), all prices within 
the equilibrium price distribution are lower than the monopoly price. 
I present an example in Appendix A in which there are three stores, 
two charging a high price and one a low price.'5 
The example constructed in Appendix A is consistent withf(O) = 
0. Thus the result that with finite search costs the only equilibrium 
entails a single price depends critically on there being an infinite 
number of firms. If there is a finite number of firms, when the lowest- 
price firm increases its price, some individuals who are at higher-price 
stores and presently search will no longer find it worth their while to 
characteristics that were valued differently by different individuals; we have a homoge- 
neous good. (b) His information acquisition technology is markedly different from the 
one employed here. He assumed that individuals obtain information about qualities via 
a reputation mechanism, not by search. Although his model is consistent with a number 
of alternative assumptions concerning what information individuals have about prices 
and how they acquire more information, it is not consistent with the sequential search 
model posited here. Salop (1979) and Salop and Stiglitz (1987) have previously noted 
that improved information may either increase or decrease the elasticity of' demand. 
Thus it should not come as a surprise that different assumptions generate such mark- 
edly different results. Rosenthal (1980, 1982) has presented a rather different model in 
which an increase in the number of sellers leads to a higher price. 
14 The fact that all stores have the same technology does not mean that the only 
equilibrium entails all stores charging the same prices (cf. Butters 1977; Salop and 
Stiglitz 1977, 1982; Satterthwaite 1979; Stiglitz 1985). By contrast, it is easy to construct 
models with price distributions when technologies differ (see, e.g., Reinganum 1979). 
15 There are, as usual, two interpretations to equilibrium price distributions. One 
entails mixed strategies, while in the other, some stores are always high-price stores, 
others low-price stores. The former has the advantage that the hypothesis that individ- 
uals know the price distribution but not which store charges which price is more 
plausible than in the latter. The appropriate search model in that case entails search 
with replacement if the period of search and the period during which prices at a store 
are fixed coincide. 
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do so. The property that the number of customers is unaffected by 
small price changes is essential to the result that the only equilibrium 
entails a single price. 
D. Continuum of Firms 
When there is a continuum of firms, all prices charged must yield the 
same profit; each firm is sufficiently small that it believes it will have 
no effect on search behavior, and hence if, at some price, profits 
exceeded those at other prices, all firms would switch their price to 
the one that generates the higher level of profits. Any particular price 
distribution will generate a particular search behavior (reservation 
prices for individuals with different search costs); this will determine 
the sales at each price and, hence, the profitability at each price. The 
question is, Does there exist a nondegenerate price distribution such 
that profits are the same at each level of prices charged? In Appendix 
B, I show that there may be; I derive the differential equation that the 
price distribution must satisfy and present an example. I also show 
that the maximum price of the distribution is below the monopoly 
price. 
III. More General Search Technologies 
The results obtained in Section II, though striking, are somewhat 
special. They depend on the special nature of the search technology. 
It was assumed that, though individuals differed in their search costs, 
the costs of making each search were independent of the number of 
searches. This assumption is crucial but implausible. On the one 
hand, many of the costs of search are fixed: once one has arrived at a 
shopping center, the marginal costs of going to an additional store 
may be relatively small. On the other hand, beyond some point, there 
are increasing costs associated with search: time and money become 
increasingly scarce. While the former effect makes it more likely that 
there will not be a single price equilibrium, the latter effect may lead 
to a kinked demand curve of the form of figure 1 and to the price 
increasing with the number of firms in the market. When there are 
many firms in the market, there is a considerable chance that it may 
take a number of searches to find the low-price store; thus the ex- 
pected cost of finding the low-price firm may increase faster than N. 
This will lower the price elasticity for price decreases, giving rise to a 
kink. And the larger the number of firms, the less elastic the demand 
curve, thus giving rise to the possibility that prices increase with the 
number of firms. 
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Rather than establishing these results in general, we will derive 
them for the two limiting cases noted earlier. 
A. Convex Search Costs 
Assume that at most two searches are feasible: 
S= 0, s2 s, st = oo for t > 2. 
Now it makes a difference whether a customer who has sampled a 
store and left can return without incurring a search cost. For simplic- 
ity, assume not. 
1. Search without Replacement 
The value of E+ is unchanged, but now an individual at a high-price 
store will set out to find the low-price store if and only if 
v(p) - v(p*) I ?: S. 
N- I 
Of those searching, only 1/(N- 1) find the low-price store, so 




E =E(p*) + N-f(i)P*X(p*) 
As N increases, this decreases. The demand curve has a kink of the 
form of figure 3 for N > 2. As N -, oo, the range of indeterminacy of 
price increases, with # ? p C pm; the price may be anywhere between 
the monopoly price and f, where p is defined by equation (15). Since 
E- is decreasing, it is apparent that, as N increases, the market price 
could increase. 
2. Search with Replacement 
Straightforward calculations establish that 
e- = E (p*) + fxp* N-i 
'+4-'!+ N2 











MR(p) X (p) L /El 
Sales 
Fic;. 3.-If f(0) 0, there is no kink at p = p- = pe, and the only equilibrium is the 
monopoly price. 
Again, a kink appears if N > 2: e + > e -for N > 2. And as N increases, 
E increases while E- decreases, with p being between p and p", in the 
limit, as N goes to infinity. 
B. Concave Search Costs 
Assume now that s1 = s2 > 0 and st = 0 for t > 2. Now if an individual 
searches after arriving at a store (i.e., if he goes to more than one 
store), he becomes perfectly informed. Hence, it makes no difference 
whether search is with or without replacement; the search condition 
for price increases is again (8), SO e+ is still described by (11). 
The search condition for price decreases, however, is now also de- 
scribed by (8) and expected sales by (12). Hence 
e= E(p*) + f(O)xp*(N - 1) ' E+ 
with strict inequality holding for N > 2: If there are more than two 
firms, then there does not exist a single price equilibrium. 
IV. Robustness of the Results 
This paper has shown that the one model of sequential search that has 
been extensively investigated in the literature, the one in which there 
are strictly positive search costs and a continuum of firms, is indeed 
1054 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
special. 1 have argued that the results of that model, that the unique 
equilibrium entails a single price at the monopoly level, are not ro- 
bust. In contrast, I believe that my results (i.e., that prices may be 
below the monopoly level and there may exist a price distribution) are 
robust. It is the absence of the extensive margin that results in the 
monopoly price being the market equilibrium price with strictly posi- 
tive search costs and a continuum of firms. The general case, which is 
depicted in this paper, is the one in which there is an extensive mar- 
gin. When there is an extensive margin, the highest price will be lower 
than the monopoly price. For instance, in markets with differentiated 
commodities or in markets in which individuals are imperfectly in- 
formed concerning the price distribution and have (as would be ex- 
pected) different priors concerning it, when firms lower their prices, 
they not only will sell more to each customer but will find that there 
are more customers willing to purchase. 
In general, I have noted that the elasticity of demand with respect 
to price increases and with respect to price decreases will not be the 
same. With concave search technologies or linear search technologies 
with search without replacement, we obtain the result that in equilib- 
rium there must be a price distribution. This is consistent with the 
kinds of results obtained earlier by Salop and Stiglitz (1977). With 
convex search technologies, we obtain a kinked demand curve. It is 
important to note that the kinked demand curve arises in a competi- 
tive model, not from the oligopolistic interactions that are central to 
the traditional kinked demand curve. 
V. Conclusions 
It is surprising that, in spite of the long recognition of the importance 
of search costs, the full implications for the nature of market equilib- 
rium have, until now, been so little investigated. 
There were two primary motivations for undertaking the analysis 
of this paper. The first was to investigate whether the standard pre- 
sumption that competition was more effective the larger the number 
of firms was valid within a search model. The results concerning the 
relationship between the number of firms and the equilibrium price 
turned out to be less clear-cut than I had hoped. The conventional 
result was established for the linear search cost technology. With a 
concave search cost technology, there was not an equilibrium price, 
only an equilibrium price distribution; however, with a convex search 
cost technology, as the number of firms increased, there was an in- 
creasingly large indeterminacy in the equilibrium price. While the 
minimum value of the range decreased, the maximum value in- 
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creased: in the limit, the maximum price was in fact the monopoly 
price. '6 
The second motivation for this study was to ascertain the conditions 
under which markets in which search was important would be charac- 
terized by firms facing kinked demand curves, which would give rise 
to the kinds of rigidities commonly associated with macroeconomic 
rigidities. I have shown that this is in fact the case, provided only that 
the search cost technology is convex. As a result, changes in, say, 
wages may nor result in any alteration, either in output or in price. 
The location of the kink depends on individuals' belief's about what 
different stores are doing (or, more accurately, since what is relevant 
is the store's perception of the demand curve it faces, the location of 
the kink depends on the store's belief's about individuals' belief's about 
the price distribution). Thus, if all (stores believe all) individuals be- 
lieve that all (other) stores have raised their prices by 5 percent, then 
the price at the kinked output will move up by 5 percent. The model 
is thus consistent with either nominal or real price rigidities. There 
are multiple equilibria. I have not, of course, provided a theory of' 
how (a store's expectations of) individuals' expectations get formed, 
of how, in other words, certain conventions get established. If', for 
instance, the costs of inputs of different firms are highly correlated 
and all firms in the past have passed on cost increases but not cost 
decreases, then in fact the price at the kink will rise with a rise in the 
cost of inputs but will not fall with a fall in these costs. 
Though the theory may have greater applicability for consumer 
goods markets than for other markets, note that, with differentiated 
commodities, the derived demand facing a manufacturer may itself 
have a kink reflecting the kink in the underlying demand curves 
facing its retailers. 
The models formulated in this paper have been basically static. 
Individuals search for and purchase consumption for only one pe- 
riod. In many cases, once individuals decide to purchase at a store, 
they remain customers at that store for an extended period of time. 
To dislodge "loyal" customers from other stores by price cutting is 
difficult, suggesting that the elasticity of demand with respect to price 
By contrast, Satterthwaite (1979) obtained all unambiguous result. In addition to 
the differences between this model and that of' Satterthwaite noted in n. 13 above, one 
other important difference should be emphasized. In this model, firms explicitly take 
into account, the fact that, by lowering their prices, some low-search-cost individuals 
who otherwise would not have searched are induced to do so. Satterthwaite ignores this 
effect. Since this induced search effect, would seem to be strongest when there are few 
firms, I had originally thotight that the presumption that prices are positively related to 
the number of firms would be even stronger than in Satterthwaite's model. 
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decreases may be low. This exacerbates the rigidity-inducing kink 
analyzed in this paper. Unfortunately, the formal analysis of such a 
dynamic model would take us beyond the scope of this brief paper. 
Appendix A 
Multiple Price Equilibria: An Example 
I illustrate multiple price equilibria in which two stores charge the high price 
Pi and one store charges the low price P2, with a fraction F(?) of those who 
arrive at a higher-price store searching, where 
V(P2) - O(p ) 2 
(since it takes, on average, 2/ searches to find a low-price store, assuming 
search without replacement). Sales at a high-price store are [1 - F(s)]/3 and at 
the low-price store are [1 + 2F(g)]/3. 
If one of the high-price stores raises its price by A, it loses some customers. 
Anyone who leaves the highest-price store (charging p' + A) will continue to 
search until he finds the lowest-price store; for if it pays someone to search 
with a 50/50 chance of saving A or pi + A -P2, it surely pays him to search 
if there is a probability one of saving Pi + A - P2 (per unit purchased). 
Hence, such an individual searches if s < &, where 
2 = v(P2) - v(pI + A). 
If the firm lowers its price, by the same reasoning any individual who is 
willing to search from the highest-price firm to the second is willing to search 
to the lowest-price firm. Hence, its sales are still [1 - F(9)]/3, with 
3s = v(P2) - v(PI + A). 
Thus the demand elasticity is 
E + 2j(9)xp 
3[1 -e(s)] 
and 
Pi - C J~2f(9)xiPi1 
- = I{E + 2, (A1) 
P1 I 3[1 -F() 
where xl = x(p1). Similar calculations establish that the demand elasticity at 
the low-price store is 
E + 4f(g)xp 
3[1 + 2F(g)] 
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So letting x,- x(p2), we get ' 
P2 - C { 4f(9)x+) 1 
P2 ~~~ 3[1 + 2F(,~)](2 
Assume constant elasticity demand curves. If p > P2, 
2x^,p2 > xIpI 
1 + 2F(s) 1 - (g) 
or 
F~) 2(P2/Pl)IL-'- 
2[l + (P2/Pl)'-] (A3) 
If f 1, this is satisfied if F(?) < 'I/. Comparing (14) and (Al), we see that 
p p p* as 31(s) 
x I I 
f(O)X*p*, (A4) 
while from (14) and (A2), 
P2 7 P* a - 1s4 + 2F2(P) f(O) X*p*. (A5) 
For instance, ifE = 1, F(9) < Vi, and fO() < 8/(+) P2 < PI < p*: both prices 
are lower than the symmetric duopoly price. It is apparent that the reverse 
inequalities can hold with other distributions of search costs. Similarly, if 
= 1. F(,() < 1/i, and f(O) < f(.), both prices are lower than the symmetric 
three-firm equilibrium (where there is search with replacement). 
Appendix B 
Equilibrium Price Distribution with a Continuum of Firms 
Let us focus on the limiting case in which production costs are zero and all 
in(lividluals purchase one unit, provided price is less than u. If G(p) is the price 
(listribution, recall that the reservation price for an individual with search 
costs s is given by 
I pdG (p) 





(B1) I ~G(p) G(p) (i 
Those with search costs s will allocate themselves evenly among all the lower- 
price stores; that is, each such store will get a number of such individuals that 
17 It is easy to conIstrtct LnImerical examples satisfying (A 1 ) and (A2). IhtIs, if E = 0, 
x = a,( ald = 1,there exists an eqUilibl-itimlwith PI = 11/ 8, P= 10/8, = 2/3 x 1/ = 
1/2, /(s) = /5, and( F(.) = 1/0. It should be noted that, in constrttcting this example, 
oily local properties of the search cost distril)bttion have played a role, in particular, f (s) 
andl F(O). Hence, the analysis applies equally to the case of /(O) = 0. 
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is proportional tof(s)/G(p). The total sales at any store, then, are proportional 
to 
(C f(s) [< f(-)ds (B2) 
Js(p) G(p(s)) 
where g(p) is the search cost of the individual for whom p is the reservation 
price. We require then that 
fC fPS) 
TP = p G (I) ds = K, a constant, (B3) 
,~(p) G (p(s)) 
for all prices in the distribution and 
Jp) G(p(s)) K 
for all other prices. 
Integrating (Bi) by parts, we get 
P 




ds G (p) = H' h(p). (B4') 
Thus we can rewrite (B3) as 





f Pf ds 
dp Ij) G G dp 
K ~ 0 
= _ - pf = O 
Hence 
p2 K (B6) 
f(g) 
Using this with (B5) gives the condition 
1 =Fi(s(p1l. l)) + K (B7) P mlax 
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Since, from (B6), 
ds 2f ~GO 'O 
dp fp f, <O 
d2s + 2 2f f" 2J 
dp2 f p2 P f- p f p 
( f2 2 ) g> 
where g dGld(p), so for there to be an equilibrium price distribution 
f' < ? if" > . f P 
~~2 
To construct examples satisfying these conditions, set 
fttf 3 
f'2 2 
Integrating, we get 
f(s) = (b + as)"/'"'i. (B8) 
Integrating again, we obtain 
(b = as) (m -(m - 2) - +n - 2)/( -- 1) F (s) =(in - j. (B9) 
Substituting into (B6) and inverting, we obtain, say for 1 p u, 
s(p) =-/21-)" - b 
a 
with the condition s(1) = O implying 
b K'" (B I0) 
From (B4') we obtain 
G (p) K I2(m - 1)p2m - 
3 f 1 p u (B I 1) 
a 
implying that if G(u) 1, 
a = K - t2(m - 1 )u2"- 3. (B 12) 
Rewriting, we get 
G (0P = ) (B 13) 
so there is a mass point at p = 1 with G (1) =ua32. Condition (B7) becomes 
(using the previously derived conditions) 
I = K (1 - ua2n) + K (u). (B 14) 
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Since 1(I) K and 0(w) =) (since m > -/2), there exists, for any m (m > 
m $ 2) and K, a value of '1 satisfying (B 14). Thus if the parameters of the 
search density, a and b, are chosen to satisfy (B 10) and (B 12), an equilibrium 
price distribution can be constructed. For instance, let m = 3 and K = 2, so 
to ~~2 f(s) 2 (1 + 4u3 / 
then there exists an equilibrium price distribution of the form 
G (p) - f or 1 ? p ' a . 
In general, the maximum price of the distribution is below the monopoly 
price; for if it is to raise the same revenues as other stores do, then the 
highest-price store must serve an interval of individuals, that is, all individuals 
with search costs greater than or equal to A. But then there is some group that 
is indifferent to searching or not, and hence the elasticity of demand of the 
highest-price store is greater than the elasticity of demand of the individual's 
demand curve. (The maximum price may be greater or smaller than the 
symmetric equilibrium price.) 
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